# Message Text

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TAGS: PFOR, PROP, EEWT, UR, US

SUBJECT: PROPAGANDA PRESENTATION ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND

TRADE PROSPECTS

**REF: LENINGRAD 333** 

1. BEGIN SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ZNANIYE (KNOWLEDGE) SOCIETY PROPAGANDIST REITEREATED PESSIMISTIC LINE ON PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-SOVIET TRADE IN APRIL 6 PREPARED PRESENTATION IN LENINGRAD. PROPAGANDIST SAID THERE NO RPT NO PROSPECTS FOR "EVOLUTION" IN DISCRIMINATORY U.S. TRADE LEGISLATION BEFORE NOVEMBER 1976 U.S. ELECTIONS. U.S.-SOVIET TRADE SAID TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY REGRESSION RATHER THAN PROGRESS. PROPAGANDIST NOTED SPECIFICALLY THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS IN OTHER ASPECTS OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS "WOULD BE MORE SIGNIFICANT" IF IT WERE MATCHED BY SIMILAR PROGRESS IN VERY IMPORTANT AREA OF TRADE. INTERESTINGLY, PROPAGANDIST GAVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO MFN THAN TO CREDITS; MFN WAS TERMED A "MAIN U.S. OBLIGATION" WHEREAS EXIM CREDITS RESTRICTION WAS CALLED A "LESS IMPORTANT PROBLEM." PUBLIC CONSUMPTION LINE HERE ON TRADE PROSPECTS THUS APPEARS TO BE ONE OF CONCEDING THAT MFN NOT IN OFFING BEFORE U.S. ELECTIONS, ALL THE WHILE TOUTING SOVIET TRADE POSSIBILITIES WITH FRANCE, FRG, JAPAN, ETC. PROPAGANDIST ALSO TOOK A COUPLE OF SWIPES AT U.S. IN COMMENTS ON FAISAL'S ASSASSINATION AND ALLEGED U.S. MACHINATIONS IN VIETNAM. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

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PAGE 02 LENING 00468 071449Z

2. LENINGRAD ZNANIYE SOCIETY PROPAGANDIST G.D. BUCHKO DEVOTED

MOST OF PREPARED REMARKS DURING SUNDAY, APRIL 6, PRESENTATION ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, SPECIFICALLY TRADE PROSPECTS. HE MADE THIS FIRST ITEM IN PRESENTATION OUTLINE, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT LINE BASED ON CLEARED PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE WHICH ZNANIYE SPEAKERS USUALLY RECEIVE PROPER TO THE "MAIN EVENT" SUNDAY PRESENTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF BUCHKO'S REMARKS.

#### 3. U.S.-SOVIET TRADE RELATIONS

AS KNOWN, MUCH WAS DONE IN THE THREE YEARS SINCE 1972 TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, E.G. OVER 40 AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ONE MAY SAY THAT IF THERE IS PROGRESS IN TRADE, THEN THERE WILL BE PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS OF RELATIONS. BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HAS BEEN REGRESSION, NOT PROGRESS, IN U.S.-SOVIET TRADE RELATIONS. WHY? BECAUSE SOME REACTIONARY CIRCLES WANTED TO PUT INSULTING (OSKORBITEL'NYE) PROVISIONS IN THE U.S. TRADE LAW. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO GIVE THE U.S. AN ANSWER IN KIND SO IT CANCELLED FULFILLMENT OF THE 1972 TRADE AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE U.S. HAD NOT FULFILLED ITS "MAIN OBLIGATION" TO EXTEND MFN. ANOTHER, LESS IMPORTANT, PROBLEM WAS THAT OF CREDITS. ONE CANNOT DO MUCH WITH \$75 MILLION A YEAR IN CREDITS. THE FORD ADMINISTRATION IS STRIVING TO OBTAIN CHANGES IN THE TRADE LEGISLATION, BUT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO UNLOCK (OTPIRALAS) THE QUESTION. MFN IS CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN ORDER FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVE NORMAL TRADE CONDITIONS. THERE ARE NO PROSPECTS FOR EVOLUTION IN THE DIS-CRIMINATORY TRADE PROVISIONS BEFORE NOVEMBER 1976 AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, HENCE TRADE RELATIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY REGRESSION RATHER THAN PROGRESS. AND PROGRESS IN TRADE CAN MEAN PROGRESS IN GENERAL. ONE MAY SAY THAT PROGRESS IN AREAS, E.G. STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD BE EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT IF IT WERE MATCHED BY SIMILAR PROGRESS IN THE IMPORTANT AREA OF TRADE.

### 4. U.S. POLITICAL SCENE

THE PRE-ELECTION STRUGGLES FOR THE NOVEMBER 1976 U.S. ELECTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN; ONE MAY SAY THAT THIS BEGAN JUST AFTER NIXON'S RESIGNATION IN AUGUST 1974. SENATOR JACKSON WILL BE A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. HE HAS SAID THAT IN MODERN TIMES THERE ARE VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS THAT ONLY A NEW ADMINISTRATION CONFIDENTIAL

#### CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LENING 00468 071449Z

CAN SOLVE, ESPECIALLY THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE U.S. JACKSON SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT IF HE BECAME PRESIDENT HE WOULD IMPROVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. JUST LOOK AT THIS STATEMENT FROM AN ANTI-SOVIET. THIS SHOWS THAT JACKSON UNDERSTANDS THAT ANTI-SOVIETISM WILL NOT IMPROVE HIS CHANCES IN THE ELECTIONS

#### 5. VIETNAM

WHY DID THIEU WITHDRAW HIS FORCES SO QUICKLY FROM THE VERY AREAS WHERE AMERICAN SOLDIERS FIRST FOUGHT AND DIED? IT IS SAID THAT HE WANTED STRONG FORCES AROUND SAIGON BECAUSE HE FEARS A COUP. HE REMEMBERS THAT DIEM WAS KILLED, "NOT WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE CIA," AND ONE CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S., WITH ITS LONG EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM, WOULD TRY IT AGAIN.

### 6. MIDDLE EAST/FAISAL'S ASSASSINATION

FAISAL WAS A STRONG FIGURE WHO CAN BE COMPARED TO NASSER. ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF HIS RELIGIOUS ROLE. HIS NEPHEW WHO KILLED HIM HAD STUDIED AT TWO AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES AND HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN THE U.S. FOR POSSESSING NARCOTICS. IT IS SAID THAT HE WAS A MADMAN, BUT THERE IS AN OLD SAYING THAT IN ANY GROUP OF MADMEN, THERE WILL BE ONE WHO IS CUNNING. FAISAL WAS ONE OF THE FIRST ME LEADERS TO CONSIDER THE USE OF OIL AS A FRONT LINE WEAPON AND HE FAVORED PRICE INCREASES. CERTAINLY, ONE CANNOT SAY THAT THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN WESTERN INFLATION AND THE HIGHER PRICE OF OIL. FAISAL HAD SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARING TO TAKE AWAY MANY OF THE OIL EXTRACTING CONCESSIONS ENJOYED BY AMERICAN FIRMS IN SAUDI ARABIA. AND HE HAD OPENLY OUESTIONED KISSINGER'S DIPLOMACY IN THE ME. ONE MAY SAY THAT FAISAL'S POSITIONS MEANT THAT HE WAS NOT WELCOME (NYE UGODEN) IN CERTAIN CIRCLES. IT IS NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NEUTRAL TOWARD EVENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA SINCE THE QUESTION OF DOMINATION (GOSPODSTVO) OF THAT AREA IS VERY IMPORTANT. NEUBERT

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